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STATE OF UTAH 
oOo — 
LON S. NIKLD; PATRICIA L. ) 
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V. MARK PETERSON and NANCY L. ) 
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Investors, ) 
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vs. ) 
B. J. RONE; RONALD A. BIEBER; ) [Category 16] 
RAB RANCH, a business entity; ) 
JAMBS A* GREGG; and David R. ) 
Bateman in his capacity as ) 
Sheriff of Utah County, Utah, ) 
Defendants and ) 
Appellants. ) 
) REPLY BRIEF 
B. J. RONE, JAMES A. GREGG, 
and RONALD A. BIEBER, 
Third Party 
Plaintiffs, 
and Appellants, 
vs. 
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation; BRIANT 
STAFFORD, an individual; et al. 
Third Party 
Defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
Fot reply to the brief of respondents, appellants 
ARGUMENT 1 
respect fu l ly submit the following r e b u t t a l : 
RESPONDENTS1 ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Respondents t r y and get t h i s honorable court to put on 
bl inders regarding the t rue i s s u e s in t h i s appeal and also 
m i s s t a t e the t ime honored standard of review in t h i s type of 
ca se . 
Respondents t r y and t r e a t t h i s case as a review of a 
t r i a l on the mer i t s . They a t tempt to misguide the court . In 
r e a l i t y , t h i s case i s not a review of a case where a jury t r i a l 
and/or t ak ing of evidence in open court has t r a n s p i r e d . 
This i s a case reviewing the co r rec tness of an order 
grant ing summary judgment. Consequently, the cor rec t s tandard 
of review of summary judgment s t a t ed in one of the most r ecen t 
ca ses decided by t h i s honorable cour t i s : 
A grant of summary judgment i s appropr ia te 
only when no genuine i s s u e of mater ia l f ac t 
e x i s t s and the moving par ty i s en t i t l ed t o judgment as a mat ter of law. And in deciding 
whether the t r i a l court properly granted judgment as a mat ter of law to the prevai l ing 
par ty , we give no deference to the t r i a l 
cou r t ' s view of the law; we review i t for 
c o r r e c t n e s s . We review the f ac t s in the l i g h t 
most favorable t o the los ing par ty . Moreover, 
because a summary judgment i s granted as a 
mat te r of law r a t h e r than f ac t , we are free to 
r eappra i se the t r i a l cour t ' s legal conclus ions . 
[Numerous case c i t a t i o n s omi t ted] Whatcott: v 
Whatcott, 790 P2d 578 (Utah Court of Appeals 
April 4, 1990) 
As for i s s u e s , respondents t r y and t e a r out a l l of the 
impor tant ones and replace them with ones which cannot be 
reached without address ing the r e a l i s s u e s . The r e a l i s s u e s as 
ARGUMENT 2 
addressed in appel lants primary brief a r e : 
|L) I s the quest ion of true ident i ty a genuine material 
fac t precluding summary judgment? 
2) How does true ident i ty bear upon p r inc ip les of 
service of process jurisdict ion, judgment against al l defendants, 
attachment of r e a l property judicial l i ens , execution and sale, 
bona fide purchaser, and res judicata? 
3) What i s fa ir and complete adjudication of an i s s u e 
requi r inq i s s u e preclusion under the pr inc ip le of r e s judica ta? 
4) What ef fec t does new evidence have per ta in ing to the 
pr inc ip le of res jud ica ta? 
Secondary and subs id ia ry to the important i s s u e s i s the 
ques t ion of va l id i ty of evidence re l ied upon by the t r i a l judge in 
grant ing summary judgment. 
RESPONDENTS1 STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY TO BE INTERPRETED 
Respondents ' next t ry to d ive r t the cour ts a t t en t ion 
from al l of the pe r t inen t s t a tu to ry law passed by our l e g i s l a t u r e , 
ru les and regu la t ions , which requi re i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by t h i s 
honorable court in t h i s case by inappropr ia te ly c i t ing an 
i n t e r p r e t i v e case not called for or allowed by the rules on 
prepara t ion of b r i e f s . This can only have been done t o cloud the 
i s s u e s and t ry and get t h i s honorable court to unduly focus on 
one small spot of the en t i r e v i s t a . Respondents ' t r y and take 
out of context one minute morsel of the ru les and mis in te ro re te 
while d i s regard ing the whole context of the law as i t works in 
soc ie ty . 
ARGUMENT 3 
The ru l e on p r e p a r a t i o n of b r i e f s does n o t s a y t o l i s t 
c a s e c i t a t i o n s a t t h i s p a r t of t h e b r i e f . I t r e q u i r e s t h e l i s t i n g 
of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s , s t a t u t e s , o r d i n a n c e s , and r u l e s and 
r e g u l a t i o n s whose i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a r e d e t e r m i n a t i v e i n t h e c a s e . 
P l e a s e d o n ' t be mi sgu ided by t h i s a t t e m p t t o block ou t 
many p e r t i n e n t s t a t u t e s and r u l e s which mus t be c o n s i d e r e d a s a 
whole i n d e c i d i n g t h i s c a s e . 
Through r e s p o n d e n t s ' b r i e f , two a d d i t i o n a l r u l e s have 
been b rough t i n t o p e r t i n e n c y whose i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a r e a d d i t i o n -
a l ly r e q u i r e d i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d . They a r e : 
Rule 62, URCP 
Rule 69, URCP 
Said s t a t u t e s and r u l e s a r e s e t f o r t h v e r b a t i m in t h e 
a p p e n d i x h e r e t o . 
RESPONDENTS1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents t r y to completely d is regard the i n t eg ra l 
i s s u e in t h i s case - t h a t of TRUE IDENTITY. Who one i s i s 
fundamental t o the de terminat ion of legal r i g h t s and r e s p o n s i b i -
l i t i e s . The i d e n t i t y of persons i s of f i r s t impor tance . Labels 
a re l abe l s . The underlying person or persons , no mat ter what 
they are cal led, i s impor tan t . We are who we a r e . The quest ion 
of what a label rea l ly r ep re sen t s must f i r s t be determined. 
Respondents t r y and blur t h i s fundamental p r inc ip le by 
saying appel lants claim t h a t "some e n t i t y controlled by the 
Vreekens" owned the Owners homes in Alpine. Appellants do not 
claim Vreekens Mcontrolledw e n t i t i e s . Appellants claim Vreekens 
ARGUMENT 4 
and a l l labels they used to hold property and conduct bus iness 
are one and the same and t h a t none of said labels have separa te 
lega l i d e n t i t y and t h a t even if they did, corporate ve i l s should 
be p ie rced , fraud precludes t h e i r use , and no one knew they were 
deal ing with corpora t ions so the personal indiv iduals a re l i ab l e . 
Respondents also t r y and throw in many conclusions in 
what they say are " fac ts" . For example, they say " i t i s 
uncontested t h a t the Nields and Petersons had no involvement", 
"which appel lants now bel iever were once owned by an en t i t y 
re la ted t o the Vreekens", no judgment has been entered as t o the 
remaining defendants" , judgment has been entered aga ins t 
ind iv idua ls who are not p a r t i e s to the ac t ion" , "Utah Cpounty 
records to not r e f l ec t t h a t the Vreekens have ever held an 
i n t e r e s t " in the Owners Alpine property , "the p a r t i e s named in 
the Rone, Greggf and Bieber lawsui t s have [never] held an 
i n t e r e s t " in the Owners Alpine proper ty , Owners "had no 
knowledge of the Vreekens1 bus iness dea l ings" . These s t a t e -
ments are al l conclusions lef t for a t r i e r of f ac t t o make. They 
are not undisputed mater ia l f a c t s . 
Respondents a lso in footnotes on page 6 of t h e i r 
Respondents Brief clasp onto an a f f idav i t made in 1983 in note 
one which was made based upon a few days i nves t i ga t i on as 
opposed to f a c t s which have been uncovered for the pas t 7 yea r s . 
The a f f idav i t merely adds to the mate r ia l f ac t s le f t to be 
decided. Once again they a lso incor rec t ly cha r i ca tu re the "true 
i d e n t i t y " i s s u e as "control". I t i s not "control" appel lants 
ARGUMENT 5 
argue* That i s only one par t of i t . Control has bear ing on the 
much g rea te r and r e a l i s s u e appel lants argue of "true i den t i t y " . 
RESPONDENTS1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondents d i s m i s s , in f ac t go to g rea t lengths to 
avoid the use ofr t rue i d e n t i t y as having any bear ing in t h i s 
ca se . Ins tead , they a t tempt to get t h i s court to focus on 
"procedure". 
But subs tan t ive p r inc ip les take p r i o r i t y over "proce-
dure" . One again , the pr ior de terminat ion of the subs tan t ive 
and bas i c i s s u e of t rue i d e n t i t y must be made before ru les of 
"procedure" and even other legal p r inc ip les can be applied to the 
s i t u a t i o n . This i s so because a l l l ega l p r inc ip les and ru les flow 
from the i n i t i a l fac t of who we real ly a r e . Pr iv i leges and 
obl iga t ions flow from people. Please do not allow respondents t o 
blur your v i s ion regarding t h i s very impor tant doc t r ine . 
State v Timlin, 232 P 543 (Utah 1925) i s s t i l l the law in 
the Sta te of Utah and in every s t a t e , possess ion and t e r r i t o r y in 
t h e s e United S ta tes of America. 
Respondents a lso throw in some more cha r i ca tu re s a t the 
bottom of page 9 of t h e i r brief s t a t i n g "the undisputed evidence 
show". Well i t does not . Two people were served in the Gregg 
and Bieber c a s e s . And in the Rone case , the ques t ion of f a i r 
and complete adjudicat ion of t he i s s u e regarding Keith Vreeken 
remains for dec i s ion . And we mention once again t h a t the 
ques t ion of t rue i d e n t i t y has to be decided before anyone can 
say Keith Vreeken and/or Chr is t Vreeken were not su f f i c ien t 
ARGUMENT 6 
people to be served summons in the Judgment Cred i to rs ' 3 c a s e s . 
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT, POINT 1 . 
Respondents would have us jus t forget the pr inc ip le of 
ID a l l t oge the r . I t ' s not t h a t convenient . Once a full hearing 
i s held before a jury or judge in opern court , opportunity for 
w i tnes se s , d i r ec t and cross examinat ion, e t c . and the i s s u e of 
t rue i d e n t i t y i s determined, then other legal p r inc ip les and 
ru les can be applied - not un t i l . 
In applying those other legal p r inc ip les and ru les , 
respondents are in er ror when they argue t h a t mater ia l f ac t s lef t 
for dec is ion do not e x i s t as i t pe r t a in s to r e s adjudicata 
applying. Appellants concede t h a t they mistakenly argued t h a t 
the p a r t i e s element of r e s adjudicata had not been met. A 
fur ther study of t h a t point shows t h a t the same p a r t i e s element 
i s e x i s t i n g . 
But the element of a f a i r and complete adjudication 
required to be determined before co l l a t e ra l es toppel can apply in 
t h i s s t a t e s t i l l remains open for decis ion! This i s as much an 
element required for co l l a t e ra l es toppel r e s adjudicata app l ica -
t ion as any of the o ther e lements . 
Mel Trimble Real Es tate v Monte Vi s ta Ranch, 758 P2d 451 (Utah 
Ct. A pp. 1988) I t r equ i r e s t h a t de te rmina t ion . That i s s u e has 
been r a i s ed in t h i s ca se . Conflicting f ac t s have been 
p resen ted . The quest ion of "fair and complete" s t i l l lumes. 
Some conf l ic t ing f ac t s before the court have been ind ica ted on 
pages 2 4 and 2 5 of Appellants i n i t i a l brief . These conf l ic t ing 
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f ac t s going to the quest ion of "fair and complete" cannot be 
ignored. 
Newly uncovered evidence ce r ta in ly d i s c r e d i t s t o f inding 
of "fully" or "completely". In t h i s s t a t e , new evidence has 
always been allowed to reach j u s t i c e . Oniv. Investment Co. v 
Carpets , I n c . , 400 P2d 564, 567 (Utah 1965) , Gregerson v Jensen , 
617 P2d 369, 372 (Utah 1980) , Reed v Alvey, 610 P2d 1374 (Utah 
1980 ) , Ferris v Jennings , 595 P2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979) , Walter v 
Pe terson , 278 P2d 291 (Utah 1954) , State v Whitely, 110 P2d 337 
(Utah 1941) 
In other words, when a l l the court has before i t i s a 
p a r t i a l p i c t u r e , and because of t h a t p a r t i a l p i c t u r e , mistaken 
conclusions are made, if t rhe full p i c tu re can be made, i t should 
be viewed and a cor rec t conclusion reached. 
"Fully" has been defined by a neighboring court t o mean, 
"en t i re ly , completely, and to the utmost ex ten t . " Keystone 
Tankship Corp. v Willamette Iron & S t e e l Co., 222 F SUDD. , 320, 
322 (D. C. Oregon) This quest ion remains a contes ted i s s u e of 
mate r ia l f ac t in t h i s ca se . 
Respondents t r y and argue on page 15 of t h e i r 
Respondents Brief t h a t every ind iv idua l must be placed down on 
paper in the English language for the law to have any legal 
e f fec t on them. The law i s an in tangib le t h ing . I t e x i s t s 
whether wri t ten in a pa r t i cu l a r too l of communication or not . I t 
i s every e x i s t i n g and p resen t in the un iverse . I t i s the e s sence 
by which c iv i l i zed people coex i s t . 
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Symbols, markings on a p iece of paper, are a l l modes of 
a t tempted communication. REALITY OF EXISTENCE i s what 's 
impor tant . The law of Greece, Rome, England and now our 
country has always recognized t h i s . That i s why, as i s quoted 
in Appellants primary brief on 10, 11 , 21 and 27, t h a t Rules 10a 
and 17d, URCP, allow pleading in JOHN AND JANE DOE names when 
r e a l i d e n t i t y i s unknown or in PARTNERSHIP OR ASSOCIATION 
labe l s . As long as the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirement of no t ice and 
a hear ing are l ived, t hese people are r e a l and they are t r e a t e d , 
and they are respons ib le for t h e i r a c t s . An examination of the 
cases c i ted in paragraph 1 of page 15 of Respondents Brief 
shows t he se cases do not hold, as respondents t r y to argue, t h a t 
a person respons ib le cannot be subject to a judgment jus t 
because h is personal lega l name i s not typed on the paper . If 
the JOHN DOE or other label he was l i s t e d under i s rea l ly him as 
far as where the buck s tops as t o i d e n t i t y , he i s bound. The 
above ru les spec i f ica l ly s t a t e t h a t as well as overwhelming case 
precedent in t h i s na t ion . 
Respondents argue on page 16 of t h e i r Respondents Brief 
t h a t even though a second ind iv idua l was also served with 
process in the Gregg and Bieber c a s e s , Gregg and Bieber are not 
en t i t l ed to t h e i r day in court t o subs t and ia t e the genuineness of 
proper se rv ice and no t ice on Kris (Chris) Vreeken. They quote 
from the Transcr ip t of the Demetrooolus t r i a l [Transcr ip t of 
Hearing, 2/23/84, a t 20-44. R1201-25, e sp . a t 36, R1217]. 
Appellants Gregg and Bieber a re s t i l l en t i t l ed to t h e i r 
ARGUMENT 9 
presumption that service was proper. Carnes v Carnes, 668 P2d 
555, 557 (Urtah 1983) In addition, the affidavit of Neal E. 
Colledge [R596-7] places in issue any contention that Respon-
dents have made that Kris (Chris) Vreeken was not a proper 
person on whom service could be made in the Gregg and Bieber 
cases. The all pervasive issued of TRUE IDENTITY of the 
individuals and their labels also renders summary judgment 
inappropriate on this contention. The same arguments apply to 
any service of summons question on Keith Vreeken. 
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT, POINT 2. 
Appellants feel they have fairly and adequately indicated 
in pages 31 through 37 of their primary Appellate Brief that 
judgment liens in Utah attach on all judgments of whatever type 
at the moment the judgment is docketed. Appellants also 
feel they have fairly and adequately indicated that the bedrock 
question of TRUE IDENTITY renders moot the argument of 
respondents regarding attachment of judicial liens in our state. 
In pages 18-30 of Respondents Brief, respondents now for 
the first time in this case, raise the issue of when execution 
lies on judgments in our state. This issue and thought was 
never brought before the trial court nor argued in respondents 
motion or memorandum in support of its motion for summary 
judgment. It is a new issue, fresh, and not passed upon by the 
trial judge. It is therefore precluded from consideration here. 
This honorable court has just most recently stated this 
doctrine again in Call v City of West Jordan, 788 P2d 1049 (Utah 
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Ct. App March 1990) when you said: 
It is well established that this court will not 
consider an issue on appeal when there is no 
indication in the record on appeal that the 
trial court reached or ruled on an issue. 
The issue cannot be considered here, but even if it 
could, respondents' recitation of Federal Court decisions and out 
of state decisions are not the established law in this state. 
The Federal decisions also interprete federal code. The 
decisions cited by respondents also narrow visioned, bad 
precedent, and not worthy of anjy weight by this honorable Utah 
court. 
The use of Rule 54, ORCP, to apply to anything else than 
appeals is untenable. Justice Zimmerman, writing for our own 
Utah State Supreme Court, has on two occasions defined the 
purpose of our state's Rule 54. In the first case in 1984, he 
said: 
Rule 54b i s "designed to avoid the po t en t i a l 
i n jus t i ce caused by r ig id appl ica t ion of the 
t r a d i t i o n a l s ingle appeal p r inc ip le . " Pate v 
Marathon Steel Co., 692 P2d 765, 767 (Utah 
1984) 
He did not say Rule 54b had or has anything to do with 
when a judgment l ien a t t a ches nor when execution on a judgment 
can begin! 
In a l a t e r case in 1986, J u s t i c e Zimmerman again 
addressed Rule 54b as one governing appeal r i gh t s - not one 
regarding a t tachment of judgments l i ens or execut ion . 
The rule on execut ion of judgments in our s t a t e has been 
completely disregarded by responden ts . Rule 62a, DRCP in our 
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s t a t e i n d i c a t e s c lear ly: 
Execution or other proceedings to enforce a judgment may i s s u e immediately upon the entry 
of the judgment, unless the court in i t s 
d i s c re t ion and on such condi t ions for the 
secur i ty of the adverse par ty as are proper, 
otherwise d i r e c t s . 
Our Utah Supreme Court so l id i f ied t h i s pr inc ip le in t h e i r 
19 82 dec i s ion of Taylor National Inc. v Jensen Bros. Construction 
Co., 641 P2d 150, 154 (Utah 1982) when they sa id : 
A par ty rece iv ing a judgment i s en t i t l ed to 
have t h a t judgment enforced by the grant ing 
court . That court , in i t s d i s c r e t i on , may 
temporari ly s tay execut ion in order to prevent 
i n j u s t i c e , but i t may not negate i t s own judgment by indef in i t e ly s tay ing execut ion 
thereon . . . . [Case Ci ta t ions and r e c i t a t i o n 
of Rule 6 2a omi t ted] 
An immediate execution i s proper, t he re fo re , 
unless the court au thor izes a temporary s tay 
of execut ion. Nothing in t h i s rule contem-
pla tes an inde f in i t e s tay of execut ion on the judgment. An inde f in i t e s tay of execut ion i s 
as if no judgment had been granted. This 
cour t , in Ketchum Coal Co. v Christensen, 48 
Utah 214, 159 P 541 (Utah 1916), s t a t ed : 
. . . If, however, in any mat ter in l i t i g a t i o n or 
d i spu te of which the in fe r io r court has j u r i s d i c t i o n , i t has regular ly proceeded to judgment, and has judic ia l ly determined and 
declared the r i g h t s of the p a r t i e s t o the 
proceedig , then the court may not exe rc i s e i t s 
d i s c r e t i on with regard t o whether i t will or 
will not enforce a judgment thus regularly 
enterd . When the judgment i s once en te red , 
and under the law i s an enforceable judgment, 
the par ty in whose favor i t i s rendered has a 
c lear r i gh t to have the same enforced, and if 
any one a t t empts t o i n t e r f e r e with t h a t r i g h t , 
i t i s a lso the clear legal duty of t he cour t , in 
case a proper appl ica t ion i s made, to enforce 
the judgment . . . . 
[The] court may not a r b i t a r i l y or capar icous ly . 
or for any reason except a sufficient legal 
reason, refuse to act when the fact is 
conceded that the ednforcement or the enjoy-
ment of the fruits of the judgment, as the case 
may be, is denied. To permit such a course 
would be tantamount to permitting a court to 
enter a judgment butr thereafter deny its 
enforcement . . . . [The] law gives plaintiff 
the right to have the judgment enforced and 
imposes the duty upon the court to enforce it, 
and no discretion is vested in the court 
whether it will enforce it or not. 
On page 2 6 of Respondents Brief, respondents try and get 
the court to buy the theory that the time when benefits accrue 
or responsibilities are received is the time when a court of law 
signs and enters a decree that that is so. They would allow 
manipulation of responsibility and benefits by the mere 
unilateral adoption of labels. That argument is not justa as is 
argued in Appellants primary Brief at p. 33-36. 
The Gauthier v Crosby Marine Service Inc., 590 F. Supp. 
171 (1984 E. D. La.) case cited on page 21 of Respondents Brief 
is really a case applying federal law - not date - in a case under 
maritime law. No state law is involved - just specifically the 
Jones Act. 
The Bank of Lincoln wood v Federal Leasing, Inc., 622 F2d 
944 (1980 7th Cir. H. D. HI.) is actually a case on a promissory 
note. The appellant objected to the courts grant of Rule 54b 
certification. The case talks of Rule 5 4b regarding final 
judgments for appeal purposes. The court indicates said rule is 
designed to facilitate appeal. Anything said regarding execu-
tion of federal judgments is dictum. There is not direct holding 
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regarding execut ion on judgments. 
The respondents misuse Redding & Co. v Russwine Const. 
Corp, 417 F 2d 721 (D. C. 1969) c i t ed on page 27 of t h e i r brief. 
The D. C. court looked a t an order and (contrary to the 
represen ta t ionf of respondents a t page 2 7 t h a t the "judgment" 
was not ce r t i f i ed as f ina l under Rule 54b) construed a s ta tement 
from the court t h a t an immediate appeal might expedi te 
reso lu t ion of the l i t i g a t i o n (page 72 3 of opin ion) . The Federal 
Courts "col la te ra l order docdtr ine" construing 28 USC 1291 
(1964) was used to allow an appeal - not deny one and under t h a t 
doc t r ine found appealable an order refusing a s t ay of execution 
and an order requi r ing a supersedeas bond. The quest ion of 
r i g h t to execut ion was not reached here . 
Furthermore, the argument of no r igh t to appeal i s in 
e r ror , because there are always r i gh t s to in te r locu to ry appeal 
and s tay of execut ion in Utah. 
Respondents are t ry ing to import not only t h e i r old 
cases regarding l ien a t tachment but add i t iona l cases from 
federa l court jud ic ia l ly l eg i s l a t i ng and using dictum. 
What i s t h i s s t a t e going to do? Follow i t s own law. 
Stand up to mislogic? Give in to the path of l e a s t effor t? Or 
uphold public will epi tomized by unambiguous s t r a i g h t language 
needing no i n t e r o r e t a t i n s t a t ed suack dab in our s t a t e ' s codes 
of l eg i s l a t i ve ly enacted law? 
Why have we fallen in to the complacent mode t h a t 
whatever big Sam dreams up, i t must be bes t? Why have we l e t 
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ourselves be captured by the big brother syndrome? I t i s bes ide 
me t h a t we are gullable enough as a jud ic ia ry to dopt 
"procedural" ru les from the Federal Court and then take federal 
dec i s ions from t h a t rule and allow the rule to transform i t s e l f 
i n to a subs tan t ive law - a foreign v i rus - which can a t t ack and 
pray on the will of the people of the State of Utah and d i lu t e , 
weaken, and s ign i f ican t ly a l t e r the s trong will of the people 
clearly declared in a law passed by the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the 
people and signed by t h e i r governor. 
Respondents argument should in the f i r s t place not even 
be considered regarding execut ions , and even then i s amis s . 
The rule and case law from Utah, not someplace e l s e , c i ted above 
clear ly says so . 
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT, POINT 3 
Appellants fee l t h e i r argument in t h e i r o r ig ina l brief a t 
pages 37-38 are suf f ic ien t to counter respondents a t tempt to 
cloud t h i s i s s u e . This i s a co l l a te ra l i s s u e to the main points 
r a i sed by appe l lan t s . 
The two cases c i ted by respondents , however, on the 
bottom of page 32 of t h e i r Respondents Brief real ly supports 
appe l lan t s ' argument regarding adequacy of the a f f idav i t s and 
ev idence . One holds the court should take no t ice sua sponte 
when i t i s placed in evidence in a mat ter before the court and 
the other says t h a t "not ice" may be taken of the record in 
another case but i t should be offered in evidence . 
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT, POINT 4 
ARGUMENT 15 
As for respondents accusa t ions on pages 33-35 of t h e i r 
Respondents Brief, l i t t l e need be s t a t ed in reply. We are sure 
t h i s court will see t h i s effort as merely another a t tempt to 
d ive r t the cour t ' s a t t en t i on from the rea l ly important i s s u e s in 
t h i s case - t h a t of TRUE IDENTITY. 
If execution on the Owners property in Alpine was so 
bad, then why did the Fraudulent Conveyances Act in effect in 
t h i s s t a t e a t the t ime of levy of the pe r t i nen t execut ions , 
passed so long ago in Utah, based upon the common law, 
spec i f ica l ly s t a t e t h a t a c red i to r when a claim has matured, 
"may, as aga ins t any person, except a purchaser for f a i r 
cons idera t ion without knowledge of the fraud a t the t ime of the 
purchase or one who has derived t i t l e immediately or mediately 
from such a purchaser , (2) d is regard the conveyqance, and 
a t t a c h , levy execution upon, the property conveyed? 25-115(2) 
OCA 1953 (old act) That ce r ta in ly i s su f f i c ien t bas i s in law for 
the appel lants to execute . The respondents ce r ta in ly are not 
"innocent p a r t i e s " . They are i n v e s t o r s . Lett's have a jury 
decide the " fac t s" . 
An appeal i s not inaopropra ia te so long as the re are 
reasonable , legal and/or f ac tua l bases for i t . Call, supra. 
There i s case law in t h i s s t a t e on i d e n t i t y which has been 
quoted, t he re i s case law in t h i s s t a t e on co l l a t e ra l es toppel 
which has been quoted, t he re i s s t a tu to ry law in t h i s s t a t e on 
judgments and l i e n s , the re are ru les in t h i s s t a t e on execut ion 
which have a l l been quoted. There i s a j u s t and reasonable and 
ARGUMENT 16 
plausible argument in t h i s case for TRUE IDENTITY. There are 
f ac t s which have been presented which se t up i s s u e s of fac t 
e n t i t l i n g the appel lants t o t h e i r day in court to decide and t h a t 
ce r ta in ly included the i s s u e of f a i r and full l i t i g a t i o n in the 
Rone ca se . This case i s not one of r eck less d isregard for 
procedure and r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s of 3rd p a r t i e s but r a the r 
l e t ' s ca l l i t a case regarding j u s t i c e and, above a l l , t ru th ! 
CONCLUSION 
This i s a c a s e r e g a r d i n g summary judgment . Appe l l an t s 
have g iven s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s t o s e t up m a t e r i a l genu ine i s s u e s of 
f a c t on t rue i d e n t i t y and t h e o t h e r i s s u e s i n t h i s c a s e . They 
have n o t been g iven t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o prove t h e i r f a c t s be fo re a 
j u ry . They have t h i s b a s i c r i g h t . Such a r i g h t i s ve ry 
f e r v a n t l y r e q u e s t e d and p rayed for from t h i s horyorable c o u r t . 
and Gregg 
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Rule 62 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
is substantial and prejudicial. Kesler v. 
Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975). 
Trial error corrected in judgment. 
A buyer under a conditional sales contract 
was not prejudiced by a conclusion of law in 
which inadvertently no credit had been given 
to him for an amount that was due to him, and 
according to which the seller was thus entitled 
to a judgment in a certain larger sum, where 
the court, in arriving at its judgment, correctly 
credited to the buyer the amount that was due 
to him, and entered judgment only for the dif-
ference. Knudsen Music Co. v. Masterson, 121 
Utah 252, 240 P.2d 973 (1952). 
Cited in State v. Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 
359 P.2d 12 (1961); Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 
2d 364, 412 P.2d 451 (1966); Estate of 
McFarland v. Holt, 18 Utah 2d 127, 417 P.2d 
244 (1966); Bank of Pleasant Grove v. Johnson, 
552 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1976); Rigtrup v. Straw-
berry Water Users Ass'n, 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah 
1977); Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 
(Utah 1980); State ex rel. K.K.H., 610 P.2d 849 
(Utah 1980); Chournos v. D'Agnillo, 642 P.2d 
710 (Utah 1982); Madesen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 
1086 (Utah 1985); Chandler v. Mathews, 734 
P.2d 907 (Utah 1987); Mountain States Tel. & 
Tel. v. Sohm, 755 P.2d 155 (Utah 1988); 
Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 907 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988); Belden v. Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 
1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); King v. Barron, 770 
P.2d 975 (Utah 1988); Mann v. Wadsworth, 
776 P.2d 926 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Ostler v. 
Albina Transf. Co., 781 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and 
Error §§ 702, 776 to 819; 58 Am. Jur. 2d New 
Trial § 31. 
C.J.S. — 5A C.J.S. Appeal and Error 
§§ 1676 to 1777; 5B C.J.S. Appeal and Error 
§§ 1778 to 1800, 1894 to 1907; 66 C.J.S. New 
Trial § 13. 
A.L.R. — Counsel's argument or comment 
stating or implying that defendant is not in-
sured and will have to pay verdict himself as 
prejudicial error, 68 A.L.R.4th 954. 
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error e=» 1025 
to 1074, 1170; New Trial <s=> 27. 
Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment. 
(a) Stay upon entry of judgment. Execution or other proceedings to en-
force a judgment may issue immediately upon the entry of the judgment, 
unless the court in its discretion and on such conditions for the security of the 
adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs. 
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judgment. In its discretion and 
on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, the court 
may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending 
the disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment 
made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief from a judgment or order 
made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a motion for judgment in accordance with a 
motion for a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a motion for 
amendment to the findings or for additional findings made pursuant to Rule 
52(b). 
(c) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal is taken from an interloc-
utory or final judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the 
court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction 
during the pendency of the appeal upon such conditions as it considers proper 
for the security of the rights of the adverse party. 
(d) Stay upon appeal. When an appeal is taken the appellant by giving a 
supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, unless such a stay is otherwise prohib-
ited by law or these rules. The bond may be given at or after the time of filing 
the notice of appeal. The stay is effective when the supersedeas bond is ap-
proved by the court. 
(e) Stay in favor of the state, or agency thereof. When an appeal is 
taken by the United States, the state of Utah, or an officer or agency of either, 
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or by direction of any department of either, and the operation or enforcement 
of the judgment is stayed, no bond, obligation, or other security shall be 
required from the appellant. 
(f) Stay in quo warranto proceedings. Where the defendant is adjudged 
guilty of usurping, intruding into or unlawfully holding public office, civil or 
military, within this state, the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed 
on an appeal. 
(g) Power of appellate court not limited. The provisions in this rule do 
not limit any power of an appellate court or of a judge or justice thereof to stay 
proceedings during the pendency of an appeal or to suspend, modify, restore, 
or grant an injunction, writ of mandate or writ of prohibition during the 
pendency of an appeal or to make any order appropriate to preserve the status 
quo or the effectiveness of the judgment subsequently to be entered. 
(h) Stay of judgment upon multiple claims. When a court has ordered a 
final judgment on some but not all of the claims presented in the action under 
the conditions stated in Rule 54(b), the court may stay enforcement of that 
judgment until the entering of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may 
prescribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the 
party in whose favor the judgment is entered. 
(i) Excepting to sureties; justification; multiple sureties; deposit in 
lieu of bond. The adverse party may except to the sufficiency of the sureties 
to the undertaking filed pursuant to the provisions of this rule at any time 
within 10 days after written notice of the filing of such undertakings; and, 
unless they or other sureties, within 10 days after service of the notice of such 
exception, justify before a judge of the court in which the judgment was en-
tered, or the clerk thereof, upon not less than five days' notice to the party 
excepting to such sureties of the time and place of justification, execution of 
the judgment is no longer stayed. In all cases where the bond required exceeds 
$2,000 and there are more than two sureties thereon, they may state in their 
affidavits that they are severally worth the amounts for which the}/ agree to 
be found if less than that expressed in the undertaking, provided the whole 
amount is equivalent to that of two sufficient sureties. In all cases where an 
undertaking is required by these rules a deposit in court in the amount of such 
undertaking, or such lesser amount as the court may order, is equivalent to 
the filing of the undertaking. 
(j) Waiver of undertaking. In all cases the parties may by written stipula-
tion waive the requirements of this rule with respect to the filing of a bond or 
undertaking. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 62, F.R.C.P 
ANALYSIS 
Injunctive relief pending appeal. 
Stay to prevent injustice 
Temporary nature of stay 
Cited 
Injunctive relief pending appeal. 
Motion for injunction to restrain dissipation 
of marital assets during the pendency of the 
Cross-References. — Bond for costs on ap-
peal, Rule 6, Utah R App P 
appeal of the divorce action should be filed 
with the district court, any jurisdiction that 
the Supreme Court may have in such matters 
should be invoked only after a party has 
sought relief in the district court, in all but the 
most exceptional circumstances Warren v 
Warren, 642 P 2d 385 (Utah 1982) 
Stay to prevent injustice. 
Equitable relief from the enforcement of a 
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attention the fact that money was not produced all times in bank on which drawn. Hirsh v. 
in court, he did waive his right in that regard, Ogden Furn & Carpet Co , 48 Utah 434, 160 P. 
more especially was that true where tender 283 (1916). 
was by check and money to meet same was at 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am Jur 2d Costs §* 23, C.J.S. — 20 C J S Costs * 76 et seq. 
24 Key Numbers. — Costs <§=> 42. 
Rule 69. Execution and proceedings supplemental there-
to, 
(a) Issuance of writ of execution. Process to enforce a judgment shall be 
by a writ of execution unless the court otherwise directs, which may issue at 
any time within eight years after the entry of judgment, (except an execution 
may be stayed pursuant to Rule 62) either in the county in which such judg-
ment was rendered, or in any county in which a transcript thereof has been 
filed and docketed in the office of the clerk of the district court. Notwithstand-
ing the death of a party after judgment execution thereon may be issued, or 
such judgment may be enforced, as follows: 
(1) In case of the death of the judgment creditor, upon the application of 
his executor or administrator, or successor in interest. 
(2) In case of the death of the judgment debtor, if the judgment is for 
the recovery of real or personal property or the enforcement of a lien 
thereon. 
(b) Contents of writ and to whom it may be directed. The writ of execu-
tion must be issued in the name of the state of Utah, sealed with the seal of 
the court and subscribed by the clerk. It may be issued to the sheriff of any 
county in the state (and may be issued at the same time to different counties) 
but where it requires the delivery of possession or sale of real property, it 
must be issued to the sheriff of the county where the property or some part 
thereof is situated. If it requires delivery of possession or sale of personal 
property, it may be issued to a constable. It must intelligibly refer to the 
judgment, stating the court, the county where the same is entered or docketed, 
the names of the parties, the judgment, and, if it is for money, the amount 
thereof, and the amount actually due thereon. It shall be directed to the 
sheriff of the county in which it is to be executed in cases involving real 
property, and shall require the officer to proceed in accordance with the terms 
of the writ; provided that if such writ is against the property of the judgment 
debtor generally it may direct the constable to satisfy the judgment, with 
interest, out of the personal property of the debtor, and if sufficient personal 
property cannot be found, then the sheriff shall satisfy the judgment, with 
interest, out of his real property. 
If the judgment requires the sale of property, the writ of execution shall 
recite such judgment, or the material parts thereof, and direct the officer to 
execute the judgment by making the sale and applying the proceeds in confor-
mity therewith. The judgment creditor may require a certified copy of the 
judgment to be served with the execution upon the party against whom the 
judgment was rendered, or upon the person or officer required thereby or by 
law to obey the same, and obedience thereto may be enforced by the court. 
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